Note of the Secretary-General's meeting with H.E. Mr. Nicos Anastasiades Crans-Montana, Switzerland, 6 July 2017, 6:15 p.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General

Mr. Eide Ms. Spehar

Ms. Bargellini

Ms. Hett

Ms. Warne-Smith

Mr. Liu

Mr. Anastasiades

Mr. Mavroyiannis

Mr. Christodoulides

Ms. Ioannou

Key points raised:

The Secretary-General shared in confidence with Mr. Anastasiades Turkey's proposal to abolish the Treaty of Guarantees and to end the unilateral rights of intervention.

Follow-up action:

None.

Summary of Discussion:

- 1. The Secretary-General informed that Turkey had presented to him a confidential paper which for the first time showed an opening on the issue of guarantees. When the Secretary-General would present his package today, it would be possible to include in it the abolishment of the Treaty of Guarantee, and to end the unilateral rights of intervention. Although Turkey was not in a position today to accept a review for the complete withdrawal of all its troops from Cyprus, it might be possible later.
- 2. <u>Mr. Anastasiades</u> demanded clarity about what this meant. <u>The Secretary-General</u> reiterated that the Treaty of Guarantee would end.
- 3. <u>Mr. Anastasiades</u> asked what would happen to the troops. <u>The Secretary-General</u> stressed that the two were talking about guarantees. The issue of the troops could be resolved at a later date. He added that an implementation and monitoring mechanism would be established.

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- 4. Mr. Anastasiades enquired whether Turkey would play a role in the implementation and monitoring mechanism. The Secretary-General explained that there would be different roles for different entities. Mr. Anastasiades underlined that he could not accept Turkey's role in the implementation and monitoring mechanism. He noted that this would only mean an end to the Treaty of Guarantee and the unilateral right of intervention. Meanwhile, Turkey would get to keep troops.
- 5. <u>The Secretary-General</u> underscored that this was a major step. Turkey was also prepared to reduce the troops. He had raised the issue of the troops but the issue of review would not be resolved right now. Furthermore, the troops would remain for external purposes.
- 6. Mr. Anastasiades said categorically that he would not be able to accept having Turkish troops remain in Cyprus indefinitely. He asked whether any other European country would have foreign troops on its soil. The Secretary-General reminded that Cyprus was today under occupation. The United Nations had no agenda of its own. To him, the Treaty of Guarantee was more intrusive and it had, until recently, been a taboo for Turkey.
- 7. Mr. Anastasiades reiterated that Turkey wanted to have a military base in Cyprus forever. Mr. Eide had made a similar proposal. It was Nuland's idea for Turkey to have a base in the north, he asserted. "We are an EU member state. What kind of independence do we have if we still have a military base on the island?", he asked. He further questioned why Turkey should have a role in the implementation and monitoring mechanism. Mr. Eide reminded him that he had already accepted that Turkey could play some kind of role.
- 8. Mr. Anastasiades said that he did not believe that Turkey had a real intention to abolish the Treaty of Guarantees. Turkey wanted to infiltrate its role into the implementation and monitoring mechanism, and hide its real intention there by abolishing the Treaty of Guarantees.
- 9. The Secretary-General underscored that he was seeking a way to end the guarantees and the foreign troop presence. The end of the Treaty of Guarantee constituted real progress but he acknowledged that it was up to Mr. Anastasiades to decide whether he could accept it or not. He added that he could on the same day work on a proposal for the implementation and monitoring mechanism. Mr. Eide reiterated that Mr. Anastasiades had already accepted that Turkey could play a role in it.
- 10. Mr. Anastasiades requested a copy of the Turkish paper. The Secretary-General replied that not everything was included in the Turkish paper. He said that he would proceed with presenting his proposal that same night and seek consensus on that basis. He added that he had told Turkey that what they had in writing was not enough.
- 11. <u>Mr. Mavroyannis</u> explained that the Greek Cypriot side wanted to replace the Treaty of Guarantee with a solid implementation and monitoring mechanism, provided that the guarantees would play no role in monitoring their own obligations.

- 12. Mr. Anastasiades emphasized that the issue of troops was not for the Prime Ministers to decide. This was after all not their country. If a proposal was to be made with regards to the troops, there would be no agreement. He added that the troop level should be rapidly brought down to the Annan Plan levels.
- 13. The Secretary-General reiterated that he wanted to end the Treaty of Guarantees as the first step, then it would be possible to talk about troop withdrawal. "Zero troops, zero guarantees" would be a non-starter. He added that the proposal tabled by the Greek Cypriot delegation was a good one, because it contained a useful element of "Coordination and Consultation Committee". He suggested broadening the scope of the proposal to build more consensus. He concluded that if it did not work, it would be difficult to move forward.
- 14. Mr. Anastasiades was concerned about what would be announced concerning the outcome of the bilateral meeting. He reiterated that he would never accept a half agreement, an agreement that dealt only with guarantees, unilateral rights of intervention but nothing about the troops. He repeated that he could not accept such an agreement and he could not present it to his people.
- 15. Mr. Anastasiades also questioned whether there was any consensus at table 2. The Turkish Cypriots had had no reaction to the Greek Cypriot proposal. He inquired where the Turkish Cypriot were on territory. The Secretary-General explained that the Turkish Cypriots wanted to base the discussion on their version of the map. He viewed that the sides could easily agree on the voting rights. With regards to equivalent treatment, the Turkish Cypriots were asking 1:1 on new permanent residency permits. Mr. Anastasiades replied that this was not the Turkish Cypriot proposal but this was what they were they were trying to get. He concluded that the Turkish Cypriot proposal on territorial adjustment was worse than the Annan Plan. He asked why the Turkish Cypriots were not saying what they actually wanted. He added that they wanted a part of Morphou and the Maronite villages and asked how he could ever agree to this.
- 16. <u>The Secretary-General</u> said that since he saw no consensus emerging from the discussions, he intended to report back on the bilateral meeting to the plenary session in the form of the working dinner in the evening.

